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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

A

HALF CENTURY'S DEVELOPMENTS

Louis Nizer*

I
HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

I

T is only during the last half-century that the law has recognized the
"right to be let alone"-the right under certain circumstances to
protect one's name and physiognomy from becoming public property.1
No mention of such a right will be found in the works of the great
political philosophers and tract-writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Spencer,
Paine. In discoursing on "natural rights," "the state of nature," "social
contract," and "the inalienable rights of man," they were concerned
only with the power of the state to abridge the liberties of the people.
Society had not yet become so complex that the individual's privacy
was in danger of encroachment.
But pqlitical, social and economic changes require the creation of
new legal rights. It is of the essence of the Anglo-American judicial
system that it operates after the fact rather than before. It decides actual
cases and controversies instead of attempting to prognosticate by means
of encyclopedic codes. Since the common law is not the mere formal
statement of an inherited traditio:µal moral code but is newly fashioned
to meet unanticipated needs, it was predestined that the privacy doctrine should be formulated. The rule was the product of its time.
The social need which became crystallized in the right of privacy
did not grow insistent until the age of great industrial expansion, when
miraculous advances in transportation and communication threatened
to annihilate time and space, when the press was going through the
growing pains of "yellow journalism," when Business first became Big. 2

* Member of the New York bar; A.B., LL.B., Columbia. Author, THINKING ON
YouR FEET (1940), NEw CouRTS oF INDUSTRY (1935), "Proprietary Interests in
Radio Programs," 38 CoL. L. REv. 578 (1938), and other articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
1
Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
This work has been cited as the perfect prototype of a law review article. With a sharp
insight into human needs, it creates a new and useful edifice on the solid foundation
of profound legal scholarship.
2
Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 at 362 ( 19 l 5) : "It
is a modern demand growing out of the conditions of life in the crowded communities
of today."
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In an era marked by the triumph of the strong man, esoteric concepts
such as the right of privacy were spectacularly fl.outed.8 In the backwash of this wave of excess, the privacy doctrine was formulated. Its
creation at that precise time was historically inevitable.
Although the right of privacy is of recent origin, its roots go back
into the ancient principles of the common law. In earliest times the law
afforded only bare protection against physical interference with life
and property, but the trend has been steadily toward a fuller recognition
of more intangible, incorporeal, spiritual values. The right to life
includes the right to enjoy life.
"Personal" rights originally provided redress only against physical
violence-battery. Later it was established that a real injury to human
sensibilities could be inflicted when one is merely placed in imminent
danger of battery by an attempt at bodily harm. In r348 or r349,
therefore, the first recovery for civil assault was granted.4 At about
the same time people began to value their reputation and their honor
as well as their skins, and in r356 the first known judgment for slander
was recorded in the law books. 5
Later, in the law of nuisances, judges granted redress for the discomfort caused by noise, odors, dust and smoke. Still later, spiritual
values found protection. In r745, for example, the cause of action for
alienation of affections was recognized. 6 The category of personal rights
also includes freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion, the constitutional privilege of a person accused of crime not to be compelled to
testify against himself, the right to recover damages for false arrest
or malicious prosecution, and the inadmissibility in evidence of confidential communications with an attorney, doctor or priest.
Similarly, the concept of "property" has been expanded to include
not only physical, tangible things, but also the incorporeal rights surrounding those things, and eventually the products and processes of the
mind. Infringement upon the rights of ownership in literary and artisWarren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 at 196
( 1890) : "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
8

and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip,
which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle."
4
Year Book, Lib. Ass., Folio 99, pl. 60.
5
Year Book, Lib. Ass., Folio 177, pl. 19, cited 2 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 536, note 6 (19n).
6
Winsomore v. Greenback, Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745).
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tic creations was made actionable in 1558.1 Good-will, as a property
interest, was accepted in 1743.8 Trade secrets and trademarks did not
receive judicial protection until 1803.9 Still later, recovery for unfair
competition was allowed and the courts began to grant injunctions
against persons who traded on another's business reputation by the use
of a name or device so similar as to deceive the public.
Progress in this direction indicated that in the natural course of
events the common law would expand its scope to include the right
of privacy. It is but a short step, for example, from an injunction
against the publication of a man's private letters to an injunction against
the publication of his picture. One's thoughts, emotions and sensations
are as much a part of him as his arms and legs. Not all the pain, pleasure and profit of life come from physical things; man's spiritual nature,
too, requires legal recognition.
Five hundred years of legal history reveal the progressive growth
of the "right of inviolate personality." What were originally deemed
the minimum rights of man ordained by nature itself have been expanded to include newer concepts of man's right to enjoy unmolested a
fuller and richer life more consonant with the dignity of human existence.
A. Conflicting Interests Involved
Every lawsuit involves a choice between opposing interests. Every
rule of law, being merely a generalization from a multitude of such
choices, represents a compromise between opposing principles. The
history of the right of privacy is a revealing chronicle of this continuous tug-of-war between two conflicting ideals.
The right of privacy, in essence, is anti-social. It is the right of an
individual to live a life of seclusion and anonymity, free from the prying curiosity which accompanies both fame and notoriety. It presupposes a desire to withdraw from the public gaze, to be free from the
insatiable interest of the great mass of men in one who has risen above
-or fallen below-the mean. It is a recognition of the dignity of solitude, of the majesty of man's free will and the power to mold his own
destiny, of the sacred and inviolate nature of one's innermost self.
Opposed to this ideal is the principle that the white light of pub7 DRONE, COPYRIGHT:

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL

54, 61 (1879).
8
Gibblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 459, 88 Eng. Rep. 573 (1743).
9
Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Jun. 215, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (1803).
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licity safeguards the public, that free disclosure of truth is the best
protection against tyranny. Liberty is not the right of one but of many.
The advance of civilization depends upon the dissemination of knowledge, and society has an absolute right to be informed on matters bearing
upon its protection and education. Frequently, the public has an interest
in an individual which transcends his right to be let alone. Since the
whole is greater than its component parts, private rights must often
yield to public interest.
Each of these ideals bears within it the germ of excess. If the pendulum swings too far in one direction, society is reduced to anarchy,
with each individual retaining all of the rights which he would have
exercised in a state of nature; at the other end of the trajectory lies
fascism, where the individual is a slave to the state.
In any single case these two opposing forces press in upon the judge.
On the one hand, he is urged to uphold the right of free speech, the
right of society to know the truth, the right to make full use of the
wonders of modern civilization which spread intelligence instantaneously to the farthest ends of the earth. On the other hand, he is urged
to protect the sensibilities of the individual from the brash and vulgar
attentions of the mob, to fence off a small corner of human existence
against the predatory advances of selfish commercial interests. Thus,
every lawsuit based upon an alleged infringement of the right of
privacy poses a dilemma in which the court is called upon to find a
point where the rights of the individual and the rights of society are
in equilibrium; a succession of such points constitutes the line in which
the privacy doctrine has progressed.

B.

Reasoning of the Courts

Growth of the privacy doctrine has been hampered by the courts'
inability to fit it into pre-existing categories. Courts do not easily break
with precedent-or the lack of it.
The right of privacy has not been universally accepted. Twelve
states ( California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina), together with Alaska and the District of Columbia,
have recognized the right as part of their judge-made law.10 Two states
10

Melvin v. Reid, n2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); McCreery v. Miller's
Grocerteria, (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 1936) unreported; Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905); Blazek v. Rose, (Cir. Ct., Cook
County, Ill. 1922) unreported, printed in PoUND and CHAFFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE
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(New York and Utah) have adopted it by legislation,11 while a federal
statute guarantees the right in a very limited sense.12 Six states (Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin)1 3
have expressly refused to broaden their concept of the common law
to this extent. The remaining states are still noncommittal.
The earliest American cases involving the unauthorized use of a
person's name or photograph groped almost unconsciously toward the
privacy doctrine. They were New York lower court decisions which
exhibited a total unawareness of the unique principle of jurisprudence
involved. 14
The first two cases which discussed the privacy idea denied recovery,
but recognized the existence of such a right under other circumstances.
In Schuyler v. Curtis,15 the New York Court of Appeals held for the
defendant on the ground that there could be no right of privacy in
the name and likeness of a dece~sed person. In Corliss v. E. W. Walker
RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY 138 (1930); Kunz v.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky.
424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909), affd. 137 Ky. 834, 127 S. W. 436 (1910); ltzkovitch v.
Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652,
134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136,
67 A. 392 (1907); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55
(1938); Harlow v. Buno Co., (Philadelphia County Ct. 1939) 36 D. & C. 101; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. (2d) 169 (1940); Smith
v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926); Peed v. Washington Times Co. (D. C. S. Ct. 1927)
55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (not officially reported).
11 N. Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50, 51; Utah Rev. Stat.
(1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
12
33 Stat. L. 726 (1905), as amended, 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 85.
is Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., (Mass. 1940) 27 N. E. (2d)
753; Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N. E. 292 (1933); Atkinson
v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, So N. W. 285 (1899); Martin v. F. I. Y.
Theatre Co., (Com. PI. Ct., Cuyahoga County, 1938) IO Ohio Op. 338; Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Hillman v. Star P1;1b. Co., 64 Wash.
691, II7 P. 594 (1911); Prest v. Stein, 220 Wis. 354, 265 N. W. 85 (1936).
14
The first decision in this field is the unreported case of Manola v. Stevens (see
NEW YoRK TIMES, June 15, 18, 21, 1890). The defendant surreptitiously snapped
a picture of the plaintiff while she was performing upon the stage in tights. The New
York Supreme Court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the publication of
the picture. Upon the trial, the defendant did not appear and the injunction, without
opinion, was made permanent. In Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., (S. Ct.
1891) 18 N. Y. S. 240, the court enjoined the use of a physician's name in connection
with a purported endorsement of a patent medicine on the ground that it was "an infringement of his right to the sole use of his own name." The opinion, however, contained no discussion of the right of privacy.
15
147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895). The ''Woman's Memorial Fund Association" sought to erect a statue to the memory of Mrs. Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler as
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Co.,1 6 a federal district court in Michigan held that the plaintiff had
waived his right of privacy by becoming a "public character." Neither
court found great difficulty in accepting the privacy doctrine in principle.
However, a reaction from these liberal views soon set in. The
first clear-cut denial of the right of privacy was in Atkinson v. John E.
Doherty & Co. 11 In that case the Michigan Supreme Court denied an
application by the surviving widow and children of one Colonel John
Atkinson for an injunction restraining the use of his name on a brand
of cigars. The court might have rested its decision on either of the distinctions drawn by Schuyler v. Curtis or Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co.
-namely, that any right of privacy which Colonel Atkinson might
have had during his lifetime did not survive after his death, or that he
had forfeited his right by entering public life. However, each of these
distinctions was specifically rejected 18 and the existence of the right
of privacy under any circumstances was sweepingly denied. The court
said:
"A disreputable person or criminal may select the name of the
most exemplary for his child, or for his horse or dog or monkey....
Why not a John Atkinson wagon, as well as a John Atkinson
Jones or horse or dog?" 19
Up to this point, proponents of the privacy doctrine might regard
the court's decision in the spirit of an honest diff e~ence of opinion. The
court went on, however, to explain that its sympathies lay with Colonel
the "Typical Philanthropist." This memorial was to be exhibited at the Columbia
Exposition in Chicago in 1893 as a companion piece to a bust of Mrs. Susan B. Anthony,
which was to be designated as the "Typical Reformer." The action was brought by a
nephew and stepson of Mrs. Schuyler, who objected to the exhibition of her statue
in such company. The New York Court of Appeals, denying the application, stated
(147 N. Y. at 447): "It is the right of the living and not of the dead which is
recognized."
16
(D. C. Mass. 1894) 64 F. 280. The widow and children of George H. Corliss, a noted inventor, sought an injunction to prevent the publication of his biography
and the reproduction of his photograph in connection therewith. The court drew a
distinction between public and private characters, stating that the ordinary person has
a right to restrain the publication of a manuscript, painting, lecture or letter, but Mr.
Corliss, having asked for and achieved public recognition and having distributed
10,000 pictures of himself, was deemed to have surrendered his right of privacy.
17
121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
18
In disapproving Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., (D. C. Mass. 1894) 64 F. 280,
the court stated that it was loath to believe that a man who makes himself useful to
society thereby surrenders any right of privacy. 121 Mich. at 379.
19
121 Mich. at 373.

532

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

Atkinson's relatives and that it was compelled to deny recovery against
its better instincts:
"We can only say that it is one of the ills that, under the law,
cannot be redressed." 20
The successive victories of progressive jurisprudence were challenged by this pronouncement that the court could recognize, but was
helpless to remedy, a wrong.
The chief argument advanced in opposition to the privacy doctrine
was stated in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,21 where the New
York Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision which created a
storm of controversy,22 refused to enjoin the use of a living person's
picture on advertising posters. The reason for the court's ruling was its
fear that the recognition of the right of privacy would result in a
deluge of litigation which would make it impossible to prevent the
doctrine from being extended step by step until it embraced all sorts
of absurdities. Thus, the court pointed out, insults might be in violation of such a right, for they wound the feelings of many persons more
deeply than the publication of their photographs. The court placed
great weight upon the fact that the right of privacy did not appear in
the works of Blackstone, Kent and the other great common-law commentators and stated that the doctrine could not be incorporated into
the law at this late date without doing violence to the settled principles
by which the profession and the public had long been guided.
In an able dissent, three judges pointed out that there was an equal
lack of precedent against the privacy doctrine and declared that legal
principles should keep step with "the march of the arts and sciences."
The decision was sharply attacked in the press and there was
immediate agitation for a remedial statute. An editorial in the New
York Times 28 was so critical that a member of the court forsook judicial
convention and wrote an article defending the decision.24, He stated that
although the right of privacy was an attractive idea to moralists and
social reformers it was unworkable practically, and predicted that if a
20

Id. at 384.
1z1 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
.
22 O'Brien, "The Right of Privacy," 2 CoL. L. REv. 438 (1902); 2 CoL. L.
REv. 486 (1902); 15 HARV. L. REv. 227 (1901); 50 UNiv. PA. L. REv. [41 AM.
L. REG. (N. S.)] II4, 669 (1902).
28
NEW YoRK TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902.
2
-' O'Brien, "The Right of Privacy," 2 CoL. L. REv. 438 at 445 (1902).
21
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statute creating the right were enacted the lawmakers would be compelled to repeal it at the next session of the legislature. However, in the
following year such a statute was adopted by the New Yark legislature
and has been in force for the past thirty-seven years. 25
It is natural that the establishment of a new legal principle should
be accompanied by dread anticipation of its extreme application. Difficult factual hypotheses which discredit the new concept may easily
be conjured up, for it has not yet acquired the safeguards of discriminate application. Time supplies the exceptions which free the law from
its own inexorable logic. In this instance, at least, the fear has proved
groundless, for only a comparatively few actions have been brought
under the privacy doctrine; far from being extended to immoderate
lengths, it has not yet reached its full development.
The Roberson case has found a small measure of support in other
states. Some courts have declared that new legal rights should be
created by legislative rather than judicial fiat, 26 others have intimated
that so-called transcendent rights supposedly reserved by the individual when he abandoned the state of nature can never be translated
into legal principles cognizable by the courts,21 while still others have
refused recovery on the particular facts before them without denying
the existence of the right for all time.28
A survey of the cases in which the right of privacy has not been
enforced indicates that the right has been definitely rejected only in
Michigan and Rhode Island. Its denial in New York, Washington and
N. Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50, 51.
Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, II7 P. 594 (19II). In Prest v.
Stein, 220 Wis. 354, 265 N. W. 85 (1936), the defendant commenced the manufacture of "Franklin D. Roosevelt Cigars," using the President's portrait as well as his
name. The court held that at common law the use of the name and photograph of
another for advertising purposes was not unlawful, and that no federal or Wisconsin
statute altered that rule. The fact that the defendant's choice of a brand name was
in poor taste did not make it illegal.
21
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909). The court stated
that the right of privacy did not exist in natural or in constitutional law, and it had
neither the desire nor the power to create precedent by giving effect to so-called transcendent rights reserved by the individual when he entered into society, or natural
instincts by which each individual is able to identify right and wrong.
28
ln Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., (Mass. 1940) 27 N. E. (2d)
753, the court held that on the facts before it the plaintiff had waived his right of privacy if he ever had any, stating (p. 7 5 5) : "The present cases do not require us to decide
whether any right of privacy is recognized by the law of this Commonwealth." In
Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N. E. 292 (1933), a photograph
had been taken of the plaintiff, her husband, his chauffeur and two other men. The
defendant newspaper blocked out parts of the photograph, leaving only the plaintiff and
25

26
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Wisconsin was upon the ground that it should be recognized by the
legislature rather than by the courts; New York has followed this suggestion by enacting a statute. In Massachusetts and Ohio the door has
been left open for a recognition of the right when the proper facts are
presented.
The earliest English cases which granted relief for what would
be called today a violation of the right of privacy strove mightily to
rest their decisions on some historically respectable ground, such as
implied contract,29 breach of trust or confidential relationship,80
the chauffeur, who were standing beside one another. The caption read: "Principals
in Local Divorce Scandal." The court allowed a recovery for damages on the ground
of libel, but refused to hold that plaintiff's right of privacy had been violated. The court
expressly stated that its decision did not relate to violations of privacy in the nature
of nuisance or the use of a person's name or picture for advertising purposes. Such cases,
the court stated, will be decided when they arise.
In Martin v. F. I. Y. Theatre Co., (Com. Pl. Ct. Cuyohoga County, 1938)
IO Ohio Op. 338, the plaintiff alleged that she was an actress of high repute and
objected to the exhibition of her photograph in front of the defendant's burlesque
theatre among p_ictures of nude performers. The court held that the plaintiff might have
an action for breach of contract and might recover from the theatre owner on the theory
of libel if damages could be proved, but refused to permit recovery for invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy. Citing Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., (D. C. Mass. 1894)
64 F. 280, the court stated that the plaintiff had abandoned her right of privacy by
exposing herself to public view for hire. There can be no privacy in that which is
already public. The court listed a number of instances in which the right of privacy
could not be enforced, implying that in other cases such a right would be recognized.
29
Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888). A photographer made
unauthorized copies of the plaintiff's portrait and sold them for Christmas cards. The
court granted relief on the basis of an implied contract that the negative was not to
be used for any purpose other than the making of such prints as were ordered by the
sitter. The feebleness of the court's reasoning appears from the concession of counsel
for the plaintiff that a photograph taken without permission could be exhibited freely,
for there would then be no consideration to support a claim of contract.
80 In the famous case of Prince Albert v. Strange, l Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng.
Rep. 1171, 2 DeG. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849), Queen Victoria and her
consort made several etchings for their own amusement and ordered some copies to be
struck off for presentation to their friends. The workman employed for this purpose
printed several additional copies, which found their way into the hands of the defendant, who proposed to exhibit them and publish a descriptive catalogue. An injunction was granted against both the exhibition and the publication of the catalogue on
the ground that the Prince had a property right in the etchings, and also because the
workman had obtained them by a breach of trust. In Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36
Eng. Rep. 670 ( l 8 l 8), an injunction was granted on the same grounds to restrain
the publication of a private letter. Similarly, in Abernethy v. Hutchinson, l H. & Tw.
28, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313, 3 L. J. 0. S. (Ch.) 209 (1825), the court enjoined a student
from publishing his notes of a lecture delivered by one of his professors. The court
rested its decision on breach of confidence, inasmuch as the lectures were given for the
students' intellectual rather than financial profit.
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defamation of character 31 or the violation of a property right. 82 While
the result reached in each of these cases is just, their forced reasoning
furnishes unwitting precedent for restricting the rights of future litigants. The attempt to compress a developing doctrine within the conservative confines of prior concepts often stunts its natural growth.
However, the American courts which have accepted the right of
privacy as part of their common law have acknowledged that they
were motivated by an innate feeling of natural justice. They did not
strive to justify their decisions by established legal dogma. The fact is
that none exists; old names do not fit new rights.
The first American case to recognize the right of privacy in principle was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 88 In that case
the Georgia court announced that it was extending its protection beyond the existing boundaries established by precedent. The court condemned the decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. as
repugnant to the ordinary concept of justice. Every individual, the
court stated, maintains a small private domain which the public may
not invade with any more justification than an individual would have
in poaching upon the sphere of governmental activity. The right to
speak and the right not to be spoken about are coexistent, each operating to keep the other within lawful bounds. Neither should be given
such free rein that the essential equilibrium of private and public interest is destroyed. Thus, the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty
embraces the right to withdraw from the public gaze as well as the
right to assemble and speak in public; personal security is jeopardized
not only by a deprivation of life, but also by a deprivation of those
things which are necessary to the full enjoyment of living.
31 Dockrell v. Dougall, 78 L. T. R. 840 (1898). An injunction was granted
against the publication of an advertisement stating that the plaintiff, a physician, used
and recommended the defendant's patent medicine.
32
Routh v. Webster, IO Beav. 561, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847), and Walter v.
Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. Div. 282, indicate the lengths to which the English courts were
driven in their effort to discover an invasion of a property right in situations where the
right of privacy was involved. In the former case the plaintiff's name had been incorrectly publicized as the director of a certain corporation. The court held that a property right had been violated because of the possibility that the plaintiff might be sued
in the capacity of a director. In the latter case the defendant advertised falsely that a
certain make of bicycles was used by the London Times. The court held that the risk
of lawsuits alleging misrepresentation constituted the infringement of a property right.
83
122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905). The plaintiff's photograph was used in an
advertisement describing the benefits to be obtained from life insurance; in an adjoining column was printed by way of contrast, a picture of a bedraggled and woebegone
individual, captioned "The Man Who Does Not Own Life Insurance." The court
granted an injunction.
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California, likewise, has upheld the privacy doctrine by citing the
constitutional guarantee of the right to pursue and obtain happiness. 84
In recent years the courts which have recognized the right of privacy for the first time have not felt obliged to indulge in lengthy
apologia.85 This is the final stage in the acceptance of any new legal doctrine. The earliest English cases avoided any mention of the right of
privacy and attempted to reach ·a just result by involuted rationalizations and ingenious twisting of ill-fitting principles. The first few
decisions in the United States enforcing a right of privacy apparently
required elaborate opinions justifying the radical departure from precedent. The recent matter-of-fact, unpretentious recognition of the right,
however, indicates more than anything else that it has become firmly
established in our law.
Some courts have accepted the privacy doctrine but have hampered
its growth by classifying it under existing legal categories. In some
Melvin v. Reid, u2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). The plaintiff, an
ex-prostitute, had been tried and acquitted of murder. Since her acquittal, she had
remarried and was living a virtuous life among friends who did not know of her past.
The defendants produced and distributed a motion picture based upon the plaintiff's
life history as revealed at her trial. The defendants also used the plaintiff's maiden
name in the film and advertised that the plot was a true story. The court held that the
use of incidents from the plaintiff's life was not actionable because they were matters
of public record. Damages were awarded, however, for the use of the plaintiff's name
in the advertisements and in the picture itself. The decision was based on § 1, art. I
of the California Constitution: "All men are by nature free and independent, and
have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
In Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., (D. C. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 845, a federal
district court in California, following Melvin v. Reid, supra, denied a motion to
dismiss the complaint in an action where the plaintiff's experiences in a hold-up were
dramatized in a radio skit entitled "Calling All Cars." When the plaintiff heard the
broadcast he suffered mental anguish which was aggravated by inquiries from sympathetic friends who sought to re-hash the near tragedy. The plaintiff's mental and
physical condition the following day was such that he was discharged by his employer
from his position as a chauffeur.
35
Harlow v. Buno Co., (Philadelphia County Ct. 1939) 36 D. & C. IOI at 104:
"In the absence of any decision on this subject by the appellate courts of this Commonwealth this court recognizes the existence of the right of privacy." Holloman v. Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454 at 458, 7 S. E. (2d) 169 (1940): "we find ourselves in agreement with a number of authorities to the effect that the violation of such
a right is under the certain circumstances a tort.••." Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416
(1926); McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 1936) unreported; Peed v. Washington Times Co., (D. C. S. Ct. 1927) 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182
(not officially reported); Blazek v. Rose, (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1922) unreported, printed in PoUND and CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY 138 (1930); Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,
212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
84
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states the courts have given the color of orthodoxy to their decision
by declaring that a property right has been violated. 86 A man's name
and countenance, they state, may have great commercial value and the
potentialities for profit should not be usurped by someone else. Therefore, it is argued, the unauthorized publication is an appropriation of
the plaintiff's property and should be restrained.
The monetary criterion, however, is a limited and inadequate
standard. Real personal injury may be suffered even where the other
party derives no financial advantage. By stressing the "property" element, undue restrictions have been placed on the privacy doctrine.
Moreover, the property theory rests upon a palpable fallacy of
logic. The existence of a property interest is the result, not the cause,
of the rule. "Property," by definition, is a bundle of legal rights, including the right to be secure in one's possession against all the world.
If there is any property in a person's name and appearance, it is only
because the courts declare that others may not appropriate it at their
pleasure; to state that such use will be enjoined because a property right
exists is to argue on the basis of an a priori conclusion.
When a judge rules that a person's picture may not be used in a
certain manner because the subject of the picture has a property interest
in it, what he means, in substance, is that he feels the publication complained of should be prevented because the plaintiff ought to be protected against misappropriation. In the last analysis, therefore, the
courts which rely on the "property" theory act upon the same impulses
86
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911). The defendant published an advertisement containing a picture of the plaintiff over the caption:
"Papa is Going to Buy Mama an Elgin Watch for a Present, and Someone (I Mustn't
Tell Who) is Going to Buy My Big Sister a Diamond Ring. So Don't You Think
You Ought to Buy Me Something? The Payments are So Easy You'll Never Miss the
Money." Judgment was granted for the plaintiff on the ground that his property
rights had been violated. In Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq.
136, 67 A. 392 (1907), Thomas A. Edison compounded a medicinal preparation for
the relief of neuralgia called "Polyform." The defendant had been granted the right
to manufacture this preparation, but sold it under labels containing the name and
photograph of Mr. Edison, without his express permission. The court found a violation
of property rights. A New Jersey case decided earlier in the same year, Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907), would seem to indicate a slightly
broader rule in that state. The plaintiff's name was improperly listed in a birth certificate as the father of a child not his own. The court cancelled the certificate and restrained the mother and child from claiming paternity. The court found that a
property right was involved because the plaintiff had been exposed to possible suit by
the child for necessaries. Despite this extreme effort to discover the violation of a
property right, the court stated in a dictum, citing Pavesich v. New. England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 69 (1905), that it would have granted the injunction
without hesitation even if personal rights alone had been at stake.
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of abstract justice as the courts which openly profess to enforce an innate
conceptiop. of natural right.
Legislative efforts to codify the right of privacy have restricted
rather than extended the right. The New York statute on the right of
privacy 87 has the same practical effect as the property theory; it permits recovery only where the unauthorized use of a person's name or
photograph is for advertising or trade purposes. 88 The statute merely
-prohibits illicit profit-making by commercializing the identity of another. This statute was enacted in direct response to the public resentment aroused by Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. and did little
more than restate the facts of that case and overrule its holding. Designed to fit the facts of one particular case, the statute has riever
emerged from its shadow. It has been difficult to overcome the inference
that other invasions of privacy were not intended to be made actionable.
Moreover, the courts have construed the statute strictly because it contains certain penal features, although these are rarely invoked. 89
87

Sec. 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law declares that the use of the name or
picture of any living person without his written consent (or, if a minor, without the
written consent of his parent or guardian) for advertising or trade purposes, is a
misdemeanor. Sec. 51 grants the right to procure an injunction and to recover damages.
If the defendant has knowingly made use of a name or picture in a manner forbidden
by the statute, the jury may award punitive damages. Three exceptions are provided
for: professional photographers may exhibit specimens of their work in and about their
establishments unless written objection is made; when a manufacturer or dealer has used
his name or picture in connection with his merchandise, anyone may do likewise; when
an author, composer or artist has used his name or picture in connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions, others may follow suit. The last two exceptions
were added to the statute in 1921. It will be seen that the statute, by its rigid limitations, has failed to prohibit several important invasions of what might be considered a
right of privacy in the abstract: (I) The name and picture of any person may be used
without his permission for every purpose other than advertising or trade. ( 2) The
name and picture of a deceased person may be used in any manner whatsoever. (3) The
name of any corporation, partnership or institution, and the name and picture of any
inanimate object, may be used in any manner whatsoever. On the other hand, no
distinction is made between public and private characters; each has the same right not
to be exploited for advertising and trade purposes.
88
"Its purpose as a remedial statute is clearly designed to stop the merchandising in the channels of normal trade of a portrait of a person who occupies a position in
which there is monetary value by publicizing same." Kline v. Robert M. McBride &
Co., 170 Misc. 974 at 982, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (1939).
89
Binns v. Vitagraph Corp. of America, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913);
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752 (1919);
Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829
(1915); Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999
(1914); Jeffries
ew York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. S.
780 (1910).
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Utah, the only other state which has enacted a statute on the right
of privacy, likewise limits recovery to cases where the unauthorized
use of a name or picture is for advertising or trade purposes, although
it is comparatively liberal in certain other respects. 40 This statute, however, has had little influence in shaping the law of other states.
The Federal Trademark Act creates a very restricted right of
privacy, but this statute, also, has not proved far-reaching in its e:ffects.41
A California statute enacted in I 899 was found to be unworkable
because, through poor draftsmanship, its terms extended far beyond
any reasonable intention. It remained a dead letter on the books for
many years, and was repealed in I 9 I 5. 42
Most legal commentators have advocated the recognition of the
right of privacy under the doctrines of common law. They have attacked the limited scope of the New York statute,43 and have expressed
the view that any statutory enactment is foredoomed to failure because
of the practical impossibility of anticipating the diversity of methods
by which privacy may be invaded.44
Wherever the right of privacy has been legislated into existence
its development has been restricted by the rigidity of the statute. In
those states which have worked the right of privacy into the fabric of
their common law, however, it has grown and altered to fit the changing conditions of modern times.
40 Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9. The Utah law goes beyond
the New York statute in two important particulars: (I) It protects the privacy of
deceased as well as living persons. (2) It extends the right of privacy to public institutions as well as natural persons.
n 33 Stat. L. 726 (190;), as amended, 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 85: "No portrait
of a living individual may be registered as a trade-mark except by the consent of such
individual, evidenced by an instrument in writing, nor may the portrait of any deceased
President of the United States be registered during the life of his widow, if any,
except by the consent of the widow evidenced in such manner."
42 Cal. Stat. (1899), p. 28, repealed by Stat. (1915), p. 761. See Cal. Penal
Code (Deering, 1937), § 258.
43
See, e.g., 8 M1cH. L. REV. 221 (1909); Ragland, "The Right of Privacy,"
17 KY. L. J. 85 (1929); Dickler, "The Right of Privacy," 70 U. S. L. REv. 435
(1936); Kacedan, "The Right of Privacy," 12 BoST. UNiv. L. REv. 353 (1937).
But cf. 29 LAw NoTEs 64 (1925); 43 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1929).
44. In 26 ILL. L. REV. 63 at 65 (1931), for example, it was stated: "If an attempt
were made to provide remedies by statute against specific types of publication as affecting privacy the difficulties would be comparable to those resulting if the same were
attempted in the field of libel."

540

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

II
THE GENERAL RuLEs FoLLOWED BY MoDERN CouRTS

As the right of privacy has come to be an accepted branch of law,
the formless generalities with which it was launched have been crystallized into recognizable legal principles. As more and more cases
are placed on one side or the other, the line of demarcation comes into
sharper focus. This gradual accretion of individual instances has built
up a set of rules which are now applied with sufficient consistency to ·
make them useful not merely as shorthand summaries of past decisions,
but also as guide-posts for future conduct.

A.

Matters of Public Interest
"Names make news" is a primary tenet of the journalistic craft.
It would manifestly be impossible, however, to publish a newspaper if
it were necessary, before going to press, to obtain written waivers from
the hundreds of individuals whose names appear in each issue. Since
the safeguarding of a free press is of paramount public importance, all
courts agree that the right of privacy does not prohibit the publication
of news and pictures in connection with items of legitimate public
interest.
The determination of what is or is not a subject of public concern
frequently requires a delicate appreciation of intangible psychological
factors. 45 The criterion is not, as the earliest cases intimated,46 the
prominence or distinction of the person whose name or photograph is
used; the differentiation between "public" and "private" characters
which was advanced during the formative stages of the privacy doctrine has not been accepted. The courts have recognized that public
curiosity is a mysterious thing and frequently concentrates most heavily
on those least deserving of attention. 47 Thus, not only persons outstanding in the arts and sciences, in statecraft, industry and finance, but
criminals, prize fighters, fan dancers and people who try to set endur45

See Sweenek v. Pathe News, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 746.
Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., (D. C. Mass 1894) 64 F. 280. But cf. Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 1_71 N. Y. 538 at 555, 64 N. E. 442 (1902): "is the
right of privacy the possession of mediocrity alone, which a person forfeits by giving
rein to his ability, spurs to his industry or grandeur to his character? A lady may pass
her life in domestic privacy when, by some act of heroism or self-sacrifice, her name
and fame fill the public ear. Is she to forfeit by her good deed the right of privacy she
previously possessed?" See also note I 8, supra.
47
Sweenek v. Pathe News, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 746.
46
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ance records are natural targets of public interest and their names and
photographs may be used with impunity in reporting their exploits.
One frequently becomes an object of attention through no affirmative act of his own, but simply because he has been an unwilling partici- ·
pant in an event of general interest.48 Occasionally, the spotlight of
"news" also strikes individuals who have played no part whatever in
the actual occurrence, but are noteworthy only because of their relationship to the protagonist.49 Even in such cases, in which it would be impossible to spell out any theory of waiver, publication is not barred by
the privacy doctrine.
What is an obvious truism with respect to a sensational headline
story on page one, however, may become a close question where the
less world-shaking items on the inside pages of the newspaper are concerned. How keen must be the public's desire for information in order
to permit a person's name or picture to be used in a "human interest"
story, rotogravure section, serialized biography or sports commentator's
column?
American newspapers customarily publish a wide variety of material which, strictly speaking, is neither news nor fiction. Such articles
include travel stories and descriptions of distant places, tales of historic
personages and events, the retelling of past news stories and surveys
48

A typical case is Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972
(1929). While the plaintiff was walking along the street with her husband, he was
mysteriously assaulted and stabbed to death. The defendant newspaper described the
event, and printed the plaintiff's picture. The court stated that although everyone has
a right to live his life in seclusion there are times when one becomes an actor, sometimes involuntarily, in a newsworthy occurrence. When this happens, he emerges from
his seclusion and the publication of his name and picture is not a violation of the
right of privacy. On the facts before it, the court held that it was for the public good
to spread information about the tragedy in which the plaintiff had been an innocent
participant.
49
In Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, l 17 P. 497 (1911), a newspaper
was permitted to publish a photograph of the daughter of a man who had been arrested
for real estate frauds, even though the plaintiff was not directly involved in the case.
Similarly, in Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290, 248 N. Y. S. 359
(1931), reversed without opinion, 237 App. Div. 863, 260 N. Y. S. 972 (1932),
the defendant published in True Detective Mysteries an article entitled "Tropic Vengeance" which described the murder of the plaintiff's daughter and the subsequent trial.
Accompanying the article was a photograph of the plaintiff seated in court. The lower
court permitted recovery for violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy, stating that
there was no relevant justification for the inclusion of the plaintiff's picture, even though
the story was a legitimate historical chronicle of an actual happening. The appellate
court reversed this holding, however, on the ground that public interest in the affair
extended even to the family of the victim.
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of social ~onditions. Although these stories do not necessarily chronicle
events of very recent occurrence, they are based on fact and are semieducational in character. In general, the courts have been quite liberal
in interpreting almost any article which appears in a newspaper as
"news," irrespective of whether it is printed in the news columns, feature pages or magazine section, 50 on the ground that the individual's
right of privacy is outweighed by the public policy requiring the circulation of information to be unhampered.
The same test is applied to the publication of a person's name or
photograph in a magazine. If the use is in connection with a factual
report of important or interesting happenings,51 the privacy doctrine will
50
Lahiri t. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. S. 382 (1937). The New
York Sunday Mirror published an article in its magazine section entitled "I Saw the
Famous Rope Trick (But It Didn't Really Happen)." One of the illustrations was a
portrait of the plaintiff, a well-known Hindu musician, playing· an accompaniment for
an Indian female dancer. In a decision containing a lucid review of the entire privacy
doctrine, the court denied recovery, stating that a free press is intimately bound up
with fundamental democratic institutions, and public interest requires the circulation
of news and information to be unhampered.
These principles were later applied by the same judge in a case falling on the
other side of the line. Schley v. New York Journal, 99 N. Y. L. J. 3107:2 (June 28,
1938). The New York Evening Journal published in its magazine section an article
bearing the following headline: " 'I'm a Slave of His First Wife'-Laments This Distracted Woman in a True Life Drama that Bares One Side of New York's 'Alimony
Racket,' in which the Vengeful No. l Can, and Often Does, Jail the Man She Loved,
Until He is Down and Completely Out." The plaintiff's picture was published with the
article accompanied by the following caption: "Mrs. Henry Schley had her Blueblood
Husband Jailed in a Dispute over an Alimony Check. He was Quickly Freed." The court
granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the
plaintiff's photograph had too tenuous a connection with the article to come within
the immunity granted to it.
In Middleton v. News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc;. 516, 295 N. Y. S. 120 (1937),
the court dismissed the complaint of model whose name and photograph appeared in
a column called "The Inquiring Photographer" published by the New York Daily
News.
51 In Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 806, certiorari
denied (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 393, the action was brought by William James
Si dis against the New Yorker magazine for the publication of an article entitled "April
Fool" in a department called "Where Are They Now?" Sidis had been a child
prodigy who, at the age of eleven, had lectured to distinguished mathematicians on
the fourth dimension. Subsequently he had suffered a nervous breakdown, and had
become an insignificant clerk attempting to conceal his identity. The court stated (pp.
807-808): "the article is merciless in its dissection of intimate details of its subject's
personal life, and this in company with elaborate accounts of Sidis' passion for privacy
and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in order to avoid public scrutiny. • ••
it may be fairly described as a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has
since sought and has now been deprived of the seclusion of private life." The court
held, nevertheless, that no recovery could be had, stating (pp. 807, 809): "The
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not be invoked. If, however, the informational factor is secondary,
relief may be granted. 52
Books, although less timely than newspapers or magazines, frequently contain material of such immediate public concern 53 that the
work possesses great reader interest, for it is both amusing and instructive. . • . Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailities of neighbors and 'public figures' are
subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population. And when
such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their
expression in newspapers, books and magazines of the day."
In Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999
(1914), the plaintiff, a young woman, was a professional entertainer specializing in
diving off a high platform into a shallow tank. The defendant published in the National
Police Gazette a photograph of the plaintiff in a costume appropriate to her act. On the
same page appeared pictures of four women vaudeville performers with the caption:
"Five of a Kind on This Page. Most of Them Adorn the Burlesque Stage; All of Them
Are Favorites of the Baldheaded Boys." The court held that the plaintiff's right of
privacy had not been violated. The Police. Gazette, said the court, was essentially an
informational periodical although its pages were devoted largely to pictures of pugilists,
wrestlers, athletes, actors and prize dogs, while its reading matter scarcely appealed to
a refined taste and its advertisements were mostly of quack nostrums and trivial things.
52
The very slight distinctions which are sometimes sufficient to alter the outcome
of a lawsuit may be appreciated by comparing the case cited above with Semler v.
Ultem Publications, 100 N. Y. L. J. 1572:4 (Nov. IO, 1938). The plaintiff was a
professional model and had posed for several photographs in negligee. The defendant
published one of these photographs in a magazine called Silk Stocking Stories. The
court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had been violated, for the periodical did
not contain information of interest to the public, but made an appeal to sex by printing
risque stories interspersed with pictures of partly dressed women.
In Krieger v. Popular Publications, 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 480 (1938),
the plaintiff, one Solly Krieger, was a professional prize-fighter. The defendant published in Sports NotJels Magazine a story entitled "Deuces for the Duke" in which the
name "Solly Krieger" appeared upwards of 100 times in a story covering 20 pages. The
court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had been violated, inasmuch as the story
was purely a product of the writer's imagination and did not describe a current event
or impart information of general news interest.
In Hewson v. Hillman Periodicals, 102 N. Y. L. J. 5:7 (July 1, 1939), the
plaintiff's photograph was printed with a "lewd, obscene and scandalous" article in the
defendant's magazine. The court denied a motion to strike from the complaint a cause
of action based upon violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy, stating: "the use of the
photograph has so tenuous a connection with the article that it must be held to have no
legitimate relation thereto, and to have been used solely for the purpose of promoting
the sale of the publication."
58 In People on Complaint of Stern v. Robert R. McBride & Co., I 59 Misc. 5,
288 N. Y. S. 501 (1936), the defendant published a book entitled / Break Strikes.
The plaintiff's portrait, together with several others, was reproduced on the frontispiece,
over the caption "They Preserve Order; Members of the Bergoff Army." In the body
of the book the plaintiff was referred to by name as a small-time East Side gunman
who had been convicted, under various aliases, of petty larceny, lewd and lascivious
cohabitation, and homicide. In the first case invoking the criminal penalties of the
New York statute, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that the book was nonfictional and purported to give a true history of professional strike-breaking.
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right of privacy is inapplicable. However, the unauthorized use of
one's name in a book of fiction may be actionable. 54
The growing popularity of motion pictures has created new and
difficult problems. The camera, potentially, is mightier than the pen,
at least as an instrument for the invasion of privacy. For one thing,
it is possible to write a news account of a parade, a riot, or the reactions
of a crowd at·a football or baseball game without mentioning the name
of any individual. A newsreel picturization of the same scenes, however, would necessarily reveal thousands of faces whose owners might
all claim that their privacy had been invaded. The impossibility of
securing written waivers before publishing a newspaper is multiplied
many times over in the case of newsreels.
Furthermore, a photographic record of any occurrence requires the
physical presence of the cameraman, whereas a written description may
be fabricated after the event by a "rewrite man" who may have received his information at second or third hand. Assuming that a particular person has a "no right" 55 to prevent the use of his name in a
newspaper story describing a particular event, does that same rule
require him to tolerate the presence of a camera man on the premises to
record the event while it is going on? An Alaska case has held that an
explorer and his equipment were legitimate objects of public concern,
and photographic news of his expedition might be gathered and distributed despite the fact that he had sold "exclusive" rights to a rival
company.56
One superficial distinction which seems to have impressed some
courts is that a newsreel ordinarily constitutes a minor component of
a program which is designed chiefly for purposes of amusement, while
in a newspaper the emphasis is on the informative element and the
fictional items are relegated to less important positions. This completely
irrelevant fact has led to the imposition of comparatively stringent rules
to prevent invasion of the right of privacy by means of motion pictures.
The distinction is unsound. The fact that a motion picture patron,
In another action based upon the same book, Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co.,
170 Misc. 974, II N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (1939), the court found that the use of the
plaintiff's name was "incidental and not a primary consideration in the treatment of
the subject-matter" of the book.
64
Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. S. 296 (1935); Damron v.
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc: 302, 231 N. Y. S. 444 (1928), affd. 226 App.
Div. 796, 234 N. Y. S. 773 (1929).
65
HoHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS (1923).
66
Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926).
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in purchasing his ticket, may have uppermost in his mind a desire to be
amused by the feature picture rather than a desire to be edified by the
newsreel-while the purchaser of a newspaper is activated by more
serious motives-does not detract from the essential similarity of the
two mediums. Both satisfy the public demand for information on matters of current importance. Both are timely and informative and have
a capacity for truth and accuracy. And both depend for their existence,
in a large measure, on the distinctly commercial arts of publicity, advertising and exploitation.
The earliest case which considered the right of privacy in connection with motion pictures, Binns 'V. Vitagraph Corporation of America,"1
held that a film reenactment of the first rescue at sea resulting from a
radio S. 0. S. call violated the right of privacy of the wireless operator.
The court rested its decision on the assertion that the motion picture
was used by the defendant for business purposes 58 since it was exhibited
at theatres to patrons "who paid to be amused." It is difficult, however,
to see why a word description should be privileged 59 while a motion
picture description, using movie sets and actors to depict an actual
event, should not. It is likely that the deception of the public, by the
pretense that the actor was Jack Binns himself, may have influenced the
court.
A later case, Humiston 'V. Uni'Versal Film Mfg. Co.60 established
the present rule that immunity is granted to fact as distinguished from
fiction, regardless of the medium by which it is conveyed. Thus, not
only newsreels of important happenings but such "human interest"
subjects as scenes in a women's reducing gymnasium,61 reenactments of
57

210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913).
The court stated, 210 N. Y. at 58: "If the use of the plaintiff's name and
picture as shown in this case is not within the terms of the statute, then the picture of any
individual can be similarly made and exhibited for the purpose of showing his peculiarities as of dress and walk, and his personal fads, eccentricities, amusements and even his
private life. By such pictures an audience would be amused and the maker of the films
and the exhibitor would be enriched. The greater the exaggeration in such a series of
pictures, so long as they were not libelous, the greater would be the profit of the picturemaker and exhibitor."
59
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. S. 382 (1937); Middleton
v. News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc. 516, 295 N. Y. S. 520 (1937); Coyler v. Richard
K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999 (1914). Cf. Schley v. New
York Journal, 99 N. Y. L. J. 3107:2 (June 28, 1938); Semler v. Ultem Publications,
100 N. Y. L. J., 1572:4 (Nov. 10, 1938).
60
189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752 (1919). The plaintiff, a woman attorney,
had solved a murder mystery. The defendant's newsreel was filmed during the actual
search for the corpus delicti. Recovery was denied.
61
Sweenek v. Pathe News, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 746. The court,
58
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the heroism and daring of law enforcement agents,62 and expositions
of Babe Ruth's home run technique 63 have been held to be privileged.
There is still some confusion, however, respecting the applicability
of the privacy doctrine to motion pictures. One case granted recovery
against the producers of a sightseeing film, 64 while other cases have
denied recovery where crowd scenes were used in fictional photoplays. 65
A debatable question is presented by the use of medical photographs. Here it is frequently very difficult to choose between public
interest and individual privacy. Where the pictures are used in a salacious context and do not have primarily an educational appeal, there
would be little dissent from the view that the subject's right of privacy
has been violated. 66
In an advisory opinion the Attorney-GeneraJ of New York held
that photographs of cancer patients might not be exhibited publicly by
the department of health, despite the "distinct social value for the
general instruction and information of the public." 61 The attorneydenying recovery1 stated (747-748): "While it may be difficult in some instances to
find the point at which public interest ends, it seems reasonably clear that pictures of a
group of corpulent women attempting to reduce with the aid of some rather novel and
unique apparatus do not cross the borderline, at least so long as a large proportion of the
female sex continues its present concern about any increase in poundage. The amusing
comments which accompanied the pictures did not detract from their news value."
62
Wettig v. Four Square Pictures, 64 N. Y. L. J. 1776:2 (Feb. 23, 1921).
68
Ruth v. Educational Films, 194 App. Div. 893, 184 N. Y. S. 948 (1920).
The motion pictures were entitled "Babe Ruth: How He Makes His Home Runs" and
"Over the Fence." But cf. Franklin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 246 App. Div. 35,
284 N. Y. S. 96 (1935), affd. 271 N. Y. 554, 2 N. E. (2d) 691 (1936) (short subject entitled "Throwing the Bull" using newsreel shots of Sidney Franklin, an American
bullfighter; recovery granted); Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 253 App. Div.
708, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 643 (1937), affd. 277 N. Y. 707, 14 N. E. (2d) 636 (1938).
64
Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. S. 800 (1932),
affd. 261 N. Y. 504, 185 N. E. 713 (1933). The film consisted primarily of actual
scenes and events in New York City with two actors, portraying guides, describing
various points of interest to a group of visiting school teachers. One sequence showed
a closeup of the plaintiff, a peddler. Recovery was granted by a 3 to 2 decision, which
was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals without opinion.
65
Cook v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 95 N. Y. L. J. 2200:7 (Dec. 15,
1936). The court distinguished the Blumenthal case on the ground that it involved a
front view closeup rather thari a mob scene.
66
Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. S. 481 (1920). The plaintiff,
in giving birth to a child, was compelled to undergo a "Caesarian section" operation.
She consented orally that a motion picture be made for exhibition to medical societies.
The obstetrician and the photographer, however, exhibited the scene publicly in
motion picture theatres as part of a film entitled "Birth." Witnesses testified that the
plaintiff was easily recognizable. The court permitted recovery.
61
N. Y. Rep. Atty. Gen. (1934), p. 374 at 375.
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general relied entirely upon Almind v. Sea Beach Ry.,68 which granted
recovery where the plaintiff's photograph was used to illustrate the
proper way to enter and leave a street car without injury.
There is a vital distinction, however, between the two situations. In
the Almind case any other model would have been just as satisfactory
to demonstrate the approved method of boarding a street car. In the case
upon which the attorney-general was consulted, however, the public
had a special interest in the particular individuals involved. They were
not to be used as impersonal demonstrators of something wholly outside
themselves. On the contrary, their very bodies were the object lessons
sought to be made available for the benefit of society. In having been
treated successfully for a serious disease affecting large numbers of people, they became "actors in an occurrence of general interest" just as
much as people who are unwittingly involved in crimes, train wrecks, or
other tragedies of headline importance. Public interest in treatment
for a serious disease would seem to outweigh the patients' right of
privacy. However, if the humiliation of publicity about a serious disease
could have been spared to its victims by deleting their identity without
limiting the information conveyed, the attorney-general's solicitude is
understandable.

B.

Advertising or Trade Purposes

In every state which recognizes the right of privacy, the name or
photograph of a living person may not be used without his permission
for purposes of advertising or trade. 69 Indeed, in some jurisdictions this
is said to be the sole criterion and the courts decide each case by attempting to find out whether it fits into a preconceived definition of
"advertising or trade." 70
68

157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. S. 842 (1913). The court stated (157 App.
Div. at 232): "The right of privacy under the statute cannot be invaded for purposes
purely informative or redemptive, whether the altruist be entirely a charitable envoy
or a railway company. No cause is so exalted that it may allure by exposing the portrait
of a person to the public gaze. The statute does not mean that the grocer may not
without written consent use another's picture to advertise his goods, but that a reformer
may without such consent expose it to call attention to ways and means of reformation."
69
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905);
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Kunz v. Allen, 102
Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J.
Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W.
364 (1909), affd. 137 Ky. 834, 127 S. W. 436 (1910); Thompson v. Tillford, 152
App. Div. 928, 137 N. Y. S. 523 (1912).
70
N. Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50, 51; Utah Rev. Stat.
(1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
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By and large, the actual results reached by this form of deductive
logic are unassailable. Thus, one could hardly take exception to the
frequently-recurring case which grants relief where privacy has been
violated by a spurious endorsement of merchandise,71 or the decisions
which have condemned the unauthorized use of a lady's photograph
in a fashion magazine 72 or a book devoted to "hair culture." 78 Nor
could one question the correctness of a ruling that an artist's name may
not be used without his permission in the sale of pillows adorned with
a reproduction of one of his paintings,74 or a decision that a university
president's name may not be used on a set of books with which he had
no connection. 75
71 In Astaire v. Esquire, 95 N. Y. L. J. 760:7 (Feb. II, 1936), for example, the
name and photograph of Fred Astaire, a well-known dancer, actor and singer, were used
in advertisements for "Swank" jewelry printed in Esquire magazine. Injunctive relief
was granted against the manufacturer and the publisher.
72
In Wolins v. La Mode Chez Tappe, 96 N.Y.L.J. 1964:i (Dec. 2, 1936), the
plaintiff, a retired photographer's model turned photographer, submitted a sample of her
work to the defendant, a hat manufacturer. She had selected a picture of herself wearing one of the defendant's creations. The defendant submitted it for publication in
a magazine called Style. The caption described the hat, but did not refer to the
plaintiff. The case is significant because the court held that the publication was for
advertising and trade purposes even though the plaintiff's photograph appeared ih the
editorial columns of the magazine rather than in a paid advertisement.
In Lane v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, II N. Y. S. (2d) 199 (1939),
the defendant sold lockets containing a photograph of the plaintiff, which was inserted,
according to the defendant, "merely to illustrate the use" of the locket, and was intended to be replaced by a photograph of the purchaser's selection. The court struck
these allegations from the answer, holding that such use nevertheless constituted "advertising" or "trade."
73
ln Riddle v. MacFadden, II6 App. Div. 353, IOI N. Y. S. 606 (1906), the
plaintiff alleged that her photograph had been reproduced in a book entitled New Hair
Culture, written by Bernarr MacFadden and advertised in his magazines Physical Culture and Beauty and Health. The court held that the complaint stated a good cause
of action.
74 Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 363, cert.
den. sub. nom. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Neyland, 290 US. 661, 54 S. Ct. 76 (1933).
75
In Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. S. 989 (1910), affd. 140 App.
Div. 9II, 125 N. Y. S. III9 (1911), the president of Harvard University had consented to the use of his name on a series of books known as The H aroard Classics and
Dr. Eliot's Five-Foot Shelf of Books. A rival publisher, without Dr. Eliot's permission,
printed an edition called Dr. Eliot's Famous Five-Foot Shelf and Dr. Eliot's Set.
The court found that Dr. Eliot's right of privacy had been violated and granted an
injunction. This result, of course, might also have been reached on the theory of
unfair competition.
In a rather puzzling case, D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App.
Div. 453, 139 N. Y. S. 200 (1913), mod. 208 N. Y. 596, 102 N. E. 1101 (1913),
the opposite result was reached on somewhat similar facts. The defendant newspaper
published a story written in the first person, supposedly by the plaintiff, entitled:
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However, the application of any such rigid rule-of-thumb formula
over a period of time inevitably reveals the pitfalls of over-simplification. The effort to make attractive catch-phrases do the work of logic
and common sense leads to baffling decisions-for example, a holding
that the use of the plaintiff's photograph in a humorous cartoon would
be privileged if it appeared in a single newspaper, but that the sale of
the cartoon by a feature syndicate to a number of newspapers was a
use "for the purposes of trade." 76
The "advertising or trade" test is unsatisfactory. In one case, 77
for example, a newspaper published the life story of a former world's
heavyweight boxing champion. The court denied recovery, stating that
the primary purpose of the article was information. Yet if information
tends to increase the interest in a newspaper and thus its circulation,
is not a trade purpose served thereby? 78
Most privacy cases involve, to some degree, "advertising or trade."
Learned disquisitions as to the meaning of the words "advertising or
trade" merely obfuscate the issue; they do not aid in reaching a rational
decision, which must be the outcome of judicious evaluation of the
weight to be given in each individual case to the two opposing forces
of the private right to seclusion and the public right to information.
The only material question is whether the ever-present commercial
factor is overbalanced by the educational or informative content of the
subject matter.

C.

Types of Names and Pictures

When is a name not a name? When is a picture not a picture? These
questions frequently confront the courts in determining whether or not
a right of privacy has been violated, for not every name or pictureeven if used for an improper purpose--will give rise to a cause of action.
"Stopping a Congo Cannibal Feast. The Adventures in the African Forest Wherein a
Young and Courageous American is Rescued Just as he is About to be Killed and
Eaten by Savages." The appellate division sustained a recovery, but the New York
Court of Appeals, without opinion, held that no cause of action was stated on the
privacy theory.
76 McNulty v. Press Pub. Co., 136 Misc. 883, 241 N. Y. S. 29 (1930).
77 Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. S.
780 (1910).
78 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) u3 F. (2d) 806, certorari
denied (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 393. The circuit court, referring to the New
York Civil Rights Law, stated (p. 8 IO) : "Though a publisher sells a commodity, and
expects to profit from the sale of his product, he is immune from the interdict of §§
50 and 5 I so long as he confines himself to the unembroidered dissemination of facts."
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It is generally agreed that only a natural person has a right of
privacy. Recovery has been denied to a partnership on the ground that
it is not a "person" and that the privacy doctrine must be limited to .
natural beings because its purpose is to enhance human peace and
happiness. 79
The same rule has been applied to corporations. It has been held
that Vassar College could not enjoin the sale of "Vassar Chocolates,"
whose packages and advertisements carried a picture of a young lady
in academic gown and mortarboard hat, an imitation of the college pennant, a college yell and an imitation of the college seal, with the words
"Vassar Chocolates" and "Always Fresh" substituted for "Vassar College" and "Purity and Wisdom." 80 The reason given was that the
college, being a corporation, could not suffer an injury_ to personal
sensibilities, however much the defendant's conduct may have caused
"regret, pain and annoyance" to the students and alumnae. The court
added the interesting argul):l.ent that Vassar College had no right of
privacy because it was a "public institution, depending upon and inviting wide-spread publicity for the _fullest return from the exercise of its
functions as an institution of learning."
In Utah, however, "public institutions" are given a right of privacy
by statute. 81
These cases have been accepted as precedent without question, yet
they represent unnecessarily restricted views. There is no real reason
why greater license should be given to use a firm name than the names
of the individuals comprising the firm. Moreover, the names of many
corporations and partnerships have been popularized as trade names,
whose monetary value would be impaired by indiscriminate use. A
more equitable rule would have been established if these cases had been
decided differently.
There appears, at first sight, to be a split of authority on whether
recovery can be had for the unauthorized use of anything less than one's
full name. Thus where the defendant used the surname "Pfaudler"
without permission, recovery was denied on the ground that a contrary
rule would prevent the use of common surnames like Smith, Jones or
Brown except at the risk of multitudinous lawsuits.82 In a more recent
79

Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. S. 56 (1916).
Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., (D. C. Mo. 1912) 197 F. 982
(quotation from page 985).
81
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
82
Pfaudler v. Pfaudler Co., u4 Misc. 477, 186 N. Y. S. 725 (1920). The
plaintiff's surname was used by a corporation which he had helped to establish, but
80
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case, however, use of the given name "Graham" was held to be actionable.88 These cases, although different in result, are not at variance in
principle, for both applied the same practical criterion. It is futile to
state as a general rule that surnames or given names, standing alone,
will or will not be protected. The inquiry in each case must be whether
the use of the particular name-taking into account the prominence
of the person and the type of publicity given by the defendant-clearly
identifies the plaintiff in the public mind.
There is also some confusion in the cases with reference to the
degree of protection afforded stage names, noms de plume or other
fictitious cognomens. The federal district court in New York has
stated flatly that the privacy statute in that state does not apply to a
stage name or any other assumed name. 84 A subsequent decision by the
circuit court of appeals in the same circuit, however, expressly disapproved this decision in a dictum. 85 This would seem to be the sounder
view. It has recently been held that a married woman may enjoin the
with which he was no longer associated. There was no allegation of fraud or unfair
competition. The court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had not been violated,
for the word "name," as used in the New York Civil Rights Law, must mean a person's
full name and not merely his surname.
88
Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., (D. C. Mass. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 358,
affd. as mod. (C. C. A. 1st 1936) 81 F. (2d) 373. Ed Wynn, a comedian, published
in pamphlet form humorous skits which had been performed on the radio. During
the program he frequently mentioned the name "Graham," referring to Graham
McNamee, a radio announcer who acted as his foil. The court enjoined the sale
of the booklets, stating that in the particular text "Graham" would, in the public mind,
mean Graham McNamee.
8
* Davis v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 195.
The plaintiff was by profession an "actress, psychic, palmist, author and lecturer,
appearing under the name 'Cassandra' or 'Casandra.' " The defendant produced a
motion picture entitled Bunker Bean in which there was a character called "Countess
Casandra." The court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had not been violated.
The court also found that the name "Countess Casandra" was materially different
from "Cassandra" and that "Cassandra" is a name derived from Grecian mythology
which has frequently been associated in literature with prophesy. Consequently, the
defendant had as much right to adopt this name for a psychic as the plaintiff.
85
Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 891.
The plaintiff, a professional actress, had achieved wide renown by portraying a character called "Aunt Jemima." She sought to recover damages for the use of this name
by two other actresses on a radio program. Although recovery was denied on other
grounds, the court stated, after noting the defendants' reliance upon Davis v. R. K. 0.
Radio Pictures, Inc., supra, note 84: "Having in mind the evident purpose of the
statute, its application to a public or stage name, as well as a private one, seems inevitable." 89 F. (2d) at 894. Despite the fact that this statement was mere dictum, the
Davis case, in effect, would seem to be overruled.

55 2

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

unauthorized use of her maiden name. 80 A publisher, in the reverse
of the ordinary situation, was permitted to use the real name of an
author who had written under a nom de plume on the ground that the
two names were synonymous.87
In infringements upon the right of privacy by "picture," strict
photographic accuracy is not required. Recovery has been granted where
the plaintiff's photograph was used as a model for a painting which
differed from it in various particulars. 88 And in Binns v. Vitagraph Corporation of America,89 there was no photograph of the plaintiff at all;
the court held that a "picture" might include any visual reproductioneven a photograph of an actor imitating the plaintiff.
The right of privacy is further qualified by the rule of de minimis
non curat lex; for incidental use of a name or photograph in a motion
picture 90 or novel, 91 where the name or picture of ~he plaintiff could
86 Bailey v. Bloomingdale Bros., 103 N. Y. L. J. 1533:3 (April 4, 1940).
The court stated: "whatever the custom may once have been, women now commonly
continue to be known by their maiden names after marriage. The right of privacy is
given to the person and should be liberally extended to the person by the name which
he, or she, is commonly and publicly well known."
87
Ellis v. Hurst, 70 Misc. 122, 128 N. Y. S. 144 (1910). The plaintiff had
originally written the books under a pen name, Lieutenant R. H. Jayne, while the
defendant, who had a right to publish the books because they were in the public
domain, printed .the plaintiff's real name, Edward S. Ellis, on the jacket. In holding
for the defendant, the court stated that the plaintiff was in the same position as a
retailer who desires to advertise his merchandise under the manufacturer's name.
88
In Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 192 App. Div. 251, 182 N. Y. S.
428 (1920), the plaintiff, a Ziegfeld show girl, posed for a photograph in a special
outfit called a "rose costume." The defendant reproduced the photograph on posters
advertising a motion picture entitled Shame (A Story of the World's Unjust Condemnation). The hat and costume were identical, and the dimensions of the drawing
corresponded with the plaintiff's measurements. Although minor changes were made,
the plaintiff was clearly recognizable. The court stated that the purpose of the statute
would be defeated by permitting representations closely resembling, although not
accurately depicting, the plaintiff.
89
210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. II08 (1913).
80
In Cook v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 95 N. Y. L.J. 2200:7 (Dec. 15,
(1936), where the plaintiff appeared in a crowd scene occupying five feet of film in
a feature-length motion picture, an application for a temporary injunction was denied.
Similarly, in Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152
N. Y. S. 829 (1915), the defendant produced a motion picture entitled The Inside of
the White Sla'{Je Traffic, which purported to show the actual places where white slaves
operated. In one scene the exterior of a factory building appeared, with the plaintiff's
name clearly visible on a sign. The court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had
not been violated, for his name was merely an incidental part of the photograph of the
building. By placing one's sign in such a prominent position, one may not prevent the
taking of a photograph by persons who would otherwise have a right to do so. .
91
In Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N. Y. S. 444
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have made no real impression on the public, recovery has been denied.
The same result was reached where plaintiff's photograph appeared incidentally in a trade catalogue.°2 There can be no dissent from the limitation of the privacy rule to substantial, as distinguished from merely
incidental and trivial, encroachments.

D. Privacy After Death
Two different questions are presented under this head: First, if a
person's right of privacy is invaded during his lifetime but he dies
before recovering a judgment, may his executors or administrators pursue the remedy in his stead? Second, is there any privacy in the memory
of the deceased; if a person's name or picture is used for an improper
purpose after his death, do his surviving relatives have a cause of
action?
At common law the rule is that "property" rights survive, but
"personal" rights die with the person. Although some courts refuse
to recognize the right of privacy unless they are able to discover a
concomitant injury to property,98 every jurisdiction would almost certainly hold that the right of privacy falls within the "personal" rather
than the "property" category. Thus in states recognizing the right of
(1928), affd. 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N. Y. S. 773 (1929), likewise, a name by
which the plaintiff had been known in his youth, Little Wayne Damron, was used once
in a novel entitled Skow Boat, which ran to 398 pages. The court denied recovery,
stating that it was obliged, in each case, to weigh the extent, degree and character of the
use made of the plaintiff's name and picture. While literary expedience may not be
advanced as an excuse for violating the statute, the Civil Rights Law was not intended
to outlaw "local color'' in books and prohibit the purely casual mention of a real
name. In Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. S. 296 (1935), the defendant
published a book entitled The Benson Murder Case in which a character called Frank
Swacker, the secretary to the district attorney, appeared. The full name was used once,
in the cast of characters; in the text only the surname Swacker was mentioned. The
plaintiff, Frank M. Swacker, was an attorney who had formerly been Special Assistant
to the Attorney General of the United States. He had never acted as secretary to the
district attorney and there was no parallel between his career and that of the character
in the book. The court dismissed the complaint.
92
ln Jung v. Yeblon & Co., 88 N. Y. L. J. 2838:7 (Dec. 17, 1932), the defendant, a wholesale jewelry merchant, published a catalogue containing a picture of
his showrooms. The plaintiff, a salesman, was shown standing behind the counter.
The entire photograph was 3¾ inches long and 3 inches wide. The plaintiff's
picture was about ¾ of an inch square. The court awarded judgment for six cents,
holding that although there was a technical violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy,
he had suffered no real injury. The defendant was not attempting to capitalize upon
the plaintiff's connection with the firm. The inclusion of his picture did not increase
the value of the catalogue; it was merely incidental to the defendant's primary purpose of showing the appearance of its salesrooms.
98
See pp. 537 to 539, supra.
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privacy at common law, a cause of action for its infringement arising
during one's lifetime would not survive his death.
In 1935, however, a statute was passed in New York which provided for the survival of personal as well as property rights. 94 Although
this statute has not yet been construed with reference to the right of
privacy, it is difficult to see how the New York courts, in the light of
its clear provisions, could adhere to their former rule that such a cause
of action does not survive the death of the injured party. 95
The common-law doctrine that personal rights die with the person
is unfortunate and unsound. The ancient distinction between personal
and property rights is an anachronism. It has long been recognized by
legal scholars that all rights are essentially personal, and that the entire
concept of property is Ip.erely a group of personal prerogatives-rules
governing what a person may or may not do with reference to certain
physical things. The distinction between personal and property rights
is superficially apparent but basically unreal. Furthermore, even if the
distinction were logically valid, no reason appears why personal rights
should die with the person. A cause of action is an asset, universally
recognized as such during one's lifetime. It should not be lost upon
death.
On the question of whether or not the name and picture of a deceased
person should be protected, recent decisions have :flatly repudiated the
early cases which held that the right of privacy was a "right of the living and not of the dead." 96 It should be noted that no age-old commonlaw doctrine-such as the maxim that personal actions die with the
person-was responsible for the former rule. In declaring that the
privacy of living persons might be protected by law, the courts, on the
same reasoning, could just as easily have held that similar use of a
deceased person's name and picture is actionable.
The New York statute, enacted in 1903, states clearly that a cause
of action was created only for invasion of the privacy of a "living person." The Federal Trademark Law 97 relaxes the rule in a rather
curious way. It provides that no portrait of a living person may be
registered as a trademark without his written consent, and adds that
94
New York Decedent Estate Law, (McKinney, 1939), § II9: "No cause of
action for injury to person or property shall be lost because of the death of the person
in whose favor the cause of action existed."
95
See Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. S. 247 (19n).
96
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434 at 447, 42 N. E. 22 (1896). See note 15,
supra.
97
33 Stat. L. 726 (1905), as amended, 15 U.S. C., § 85.
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no portrait of a deceased President of the United States may be registered during the lifetime of his widow without her written consent.
The Utah statute 98 rejects the common-law rule entirely and provides
that the written permission of the heirs or representatives of a deceased
person is as necessary as the written permission of a living person.
The more recent judicial opinion in other states has been in accord
with this view. Recovery has been allowed where the defendant published, without permission of the parents, photographs of the bodies of
deformed children who had died in infancy. 99 These cases, however,
do not stand for the proposition that dead people have a right of privacy, or any such esoteric doctrine. To state that only the right of the
living and not of the dead is recognized, is to misconstrue the problem.
The fact is that the privacy of the living, in a very real sense, is involved. It cannot be doubted that photographs of the bodies of deformed children call attention to the parents and invade their right to
be let alone. A sensitive person, desiring seclusion and freedom from
the curious comment of the crowd, would be as easily wounded by an
article commenting unnecessarily on his deceased children as he would
by a similar article concerning himself.100
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
ln Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912), a woman gave
birth to Siamese twins. The children died soon afterward, and the father employed
a photographer to take pictures of their bodies. The photographer made additional
prints for his own use and procured a copyright in his own name. The father and
mother brought suit and recovered a judgment. In Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,
171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930), a child was born with its heart on the outside
of its body. It was taken to a hospital in an effort to remedy the deformity by surgery,
but the operation was unsuccessful and the child died. Without the permission of the
parents, the hospital gave the story to the press and permitted photographs to be taken
of the body. The parents brought suit, contending that the:r had a right to keep
secret the facts relating to their deformed child, and also a right to have its body and
sexual organs properly covered at all times. In a three to two decision, the court permitted recovery. But in Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304 at
3u, 95 P. (2d) 491 (1939), where the plaintiff's right of privacy was held not to
have been violated by publication of the details concerning his wife's suicide, the
court said it was unable to recognize "a right to be spared unhappiness through publicity concerning another person because of one's relationship to such person."
100
A contemporary commentator, disapproving of the reasoning in Schuyler v.
Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1896), stated: "It is surely a mistaken view of
the ordinary facts of human feeling to say that a naturally retiring person can tolerate
the anticipation of publicity after his death from which he would shrink painfully during
his life. Surely a person to whom privacy is of any value whatever must contemplate a
future publicity with almost as much chagrin as a present one. Could the learned judge,
for example, bear for an instant the thought of a public representation or description
of his courtship after his death?"
98
99
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The law has progressed from protection of the physical person to
protection of reputation and sensibilities. It is no greater transition from
protection of a dead body to protection of the reputation and memory
of a departed relative. Nor are th~ sensibilities of the living concerning
their departed kin to be ignored. Judicial recognition of the fact that
one's own privacy may be invaded by unauthorized use of the name or
picture of a deceased member of his family is a step forward in the
historical tradition of the common law.

E.

Consent

In states recognizing the right of privacy at common law, consent
may be implied by conduct as well as expressed by words. In a recent
case, for example, it was held not actionable to snap a candid camera
picture of a "bubble dancer" on the ground that her course of conduct
was tantamount to a waiver of her right of privacy.101
The courts frequently use the language of implied consent to deny
recovery to "public characters.moz This reasoning, however, is fallacious.
The true distinction is not between public and private characters, but
between matters of public or private interest. The determining factor
is the content and character of the publication, not the standing of the
individual. Even the most famous have a right to be protected against
unauthorized use of their names and photographs in a manner not
connected with their public life. 108
101 Unreported; see newspapers Nov. 8, 1938, and T1ME, Nov, 14, 1938, p. 34.
The bubble dancer, Sally Rand, attacked the photographer, inflicting painful physical
injuries. He retaliated by suing for assault and battery. Miss Rand interposed a defense
of justification, claiming that she was merely defending herself against an unwarranted
invasion of her right of privacy. The court held for the plaintiff, however, stating:
"If Sally Rand were to take a bath and charge admission, there would be no violation
of her right of privacy if someone came in and took a picture."
102
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304 at 312, 95 P. (2d)
491 (1939): "It seems to us that by her own conduct Mrs. Metter waived any existing
right of privacy. • . . She went to a public edifice in the heart of a large city and
there ended her life by plunging from such high building. • •• It was her own act
which waived any right to keep her picture from public observation in connection with
the news account of her suicide." In Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W.
1076 (1911), the court stated that consent may be expressed or implied, and when
one engages in public affairs, he impliedly consents to become the object of publicity.
In Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., (D. C. Mass. 1890) 64 F. 280, likewise, the court
drew a distinction between public and private characters. A statesman, author, artist or
inventor who makes a bid for public recognition, the court held, thereby surrenders his
right of privacy.
103
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909), affd.
137 Ky. 834, 127 S. W. 436 (1910) (senator); Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc, 95, 120
N. Y. S. 989 (1910), affd. 140 App. Div. 9u, 125 N. Y. S. 1u9 (1910)_ (univer-
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Both the New York and Utah statutes 104 provide that consent must
be in writing. Some courts have interpreted this provision literally,105
but most judges look with disfavor upon the plaintiff who consents
orally to the use of his name or picture and then brings suit on the
ground that the written consent required by statute is lacking. In such
cases every effort is made to find a basis for the denial of recovery.
Sometimes the doctrine of "unclean hands" is used,106 sometimes the
court invokes the general rule that the protection of a statute created
for the benefit of an individual may be waived by him,107 and sometimes a verdict for six cents is given,108 while in other instances the
sity president); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392
(1907) (inventor); Sinclair v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 94 N. Y. L. J. 291:3
(July 29, 1935) (actor).
104 N. Y. Civil Rights Law, (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50, 51; Utah Rev. Stat.
(1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
105
Thus, in Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. S. 842
(1913), although the plaintiff knew that her picture was being taken for the purpose
of illustrating the right and wrong way to board a street car, the court granted recovery,
stating that oral consent could not be made to take the place of the written consent
specifically required by statute. Similarly, in Wyatt v. James McCreery & Co., 126
App. Div. 650, III N. Y. S. 86 (1908), the plaintiff, an actress, purchased photographs at a special "professional rate" in consideration of oral permission to use the
photographs for advertising purposes. The court held that permission in this form was
insufficient and judgment was granted for the plaintiff.
106
Wendell v. Conduit Machine Co., 74 Misc. 201, 133 N. Y. S. 758 (19II).
The plaintiff consented orally that his photograph be incorporated in advertisements of
his employer's business. When the relationship was about to terminate, however, he
sought to enjoin further use of his pictures. The court denied the plaintiff's application,
stating (74 Misc. at 203): "[The statute] never meant that an employee could
fraudulently, or by his culpable negligence amounting to constructive fraud, mislead
his employer into expenditures to build up his trade and thereafter claim the intervention of a court of equity where such intervention would visit a material injury upon
the ,employer." Similarly in Hammond v. Crowell Pub. Co., 98 N. Y. L. J. 1366:3
(Oct. 27, 1937), the court held that a defense of estoppel was not insufficient in law.
107
Alexandre v. Westchester Newspapers, 169 Misc. 398, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 744
(1938).
108 In Harris v. H. W. Gossard Co., 194 App. Div. 688, 185 N. Y. S. 861
( I 929), the court held that a verdict for six cents was not insufficient, since the jury
evidently accepted the defendant's testimony that the plaintiff had consented orally
to the use of her name and portrait. The court in Sidney v. A. S. Beck Shoe Corp., 153
Misc. 166, 274 N. Y. S. 559 (1934), went even further. The defendant used the
name and photograph of Sylvia Sidney, a well-known actress, in a shoe advertisement.
The defendant alleged, as a partial defense, that a general custom existed in the
theatrical profession to encourage the use of names and pictures in advertisements for
purposes of exploitation. On a motion to strike out the defense, the court held that it
might be pleaded in mitigation of damages. In Lane v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 171
Misc. 66, II N. Y. S. (2d) 199 (1939), the court held that oral consent might be
pleaded in mitigation of damages.
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court simply holds for the defendant without stating any reason. 109
In any event, oral consent is given great moral, if not legal, weight.110
Where a plaintiff has signed a written consent to the use of his
name or photograph, he may not recover on the theory that there was
an oral understanding limiting the scope of the written consent, although the document may be rescinded in an equitable action if there
was fraud in the inducement.111
Only one case has been found which discusses the question of revocation of consent. It is there held that a consent to the use of one's
name or photograph is a mere revocable license which may be withdrawn at any time. 112 The injustice of such a rule is illustrated in that
very case; the defendant had spent a considerable amount of money
over a period of twenty years popularizing his product, and inability
to make further use of the name by which it had become known to the
public severely injured his business. The equitable doctrine of estoppel
should have been applied to prevent the plaintiff from luring the
defendant into such a trap.
The statutory provision that consent must be in writing, although
well motivated, has created unnecessary difficulties. All too frequently,
the legislature's effort to protect gullible plaintiffs has caused injustice
to gullible defendants, while the courts have sought to overcome the
imposed restrictions in order to reach a just result. The test should be
109

White v. White, 160 App. Div. 709, 145 N. Y. S. 743 (1914). The court
denied recovery even though it was unable to find a reason for not applying the statute.
The plaintiff had formed a corporation whose name was the same as his own. After
selling his stock in the corporation, he attempted to restrain the use of his name by the
new owners. The court refused to grant the application, stating merely that the plaintiff,
by his conduct, had evidently "intended" to give the corporation the benefit of his
name and prestige.
110
In Sweenek v. Pathe News, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 746 at 748,
the case involving newsreels of a reducing class in a gymnasium, the court stated: "It
is conceded by counsel for the defendant that the written consent required by the
statute was not given. Oral consent, however, was apparently given••.• While the
court is not prepared to say that the express words and requirement of the statute may
always be regarded as waived by oral consent, yet, such consent having been given,
the whole action leaves the impression of being an afterthought on the part of the
plaintiff."
111
Merendi v. General Cigar Co., 103 N. Y. L. J. n35:6 (March 12, 1940).
112
Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, 151 Misc. 692, 271 N. Y. S. 187 (1933).
The plaintiff had given express written consent to the use of her name in designating
the defendant's product as "Parfum Mary Garden." The court summarized the facts
as follows (151 Misc. at 693): "Entranced, perchance, by the seductiveness of the
aroma of the perfume, she indulged herself in poetic flight by writing Dr. Mason:
'How could I object to anything so charming? And thanks a million times for the
bottles already received.' "
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the reality and genuineness of the consent. The purpose of the statutory
requirement of written consent is to guard against fraudulent defenses.
Yet some kinds of oral consent, bolstered by conduct, are as convincing
as any writing. If the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the
trier of fact that the plaintiff has given his consent, it should be immaterial what form that consent takes. If the alleged consent is oral,
the burden to establish it should be heavier and the degree of proof
higher.

III
CoNCLUSION

The right of privacy, in the brief span of its existence, has mirrored
a contemporary struggle between the rights of the individual and the
rights of society.
Historically, the doctrine grew up in response to a need created
by the complexities of modern life. Every new offensive weapon is met
by a corresponding improvement in defensive armament; so the right
of privacy is the protective bulwark built up against the threatened
annihilation of man's personal life by unprecedented advances in communication and transportation. The privacy doctrine is the law's answer
to the abuses made possible by unrestrained and irresponsible operation of newspapers with their far-flung agencies for gathering information, high-speed printing presses, and huge circulations; motion pictures, which bring vivid impressions of the vast panorama of life to
many whose mental world would.otherwise be bounded by the confines
of theit own narrow existence; nation-wide networks of radio stations,
sending the word instantaneously into millions of homes; and the
supporting forces of telephone, telegraph, teletype, .cable, facsimile
printing, microfilm, television and other mechanical devices by which
it may soon be possible to know everything about everybody everywhere.
The privacy doctrine has been handicapped in its development by
the fact that it came into being after the common law had been fairly
well crystallized. Many judges who were trained merely to apply the
law as they found it ignored the tradition underlying our Anglo-Saxon
system of jurisprudence and failed to apply the principles behind existing rules to new situations as they arose. Consequently the doctrine
was hampered by the inability of some courts to accept the idea that
it is not an interloper but a full-fl.edged, socially acceptable member
of the legal family.
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Once the right of privacy is recognized in its true light, its future
development will be simple. It gives expression to an ideal which conceives of the individual as a unit not to be obliterated by society. Everyone has a right to live his own life in quiet and solitude. Modesty and
reticence need not be sacrificed entirely to public clamor. No one owes
an obligation to permit others to profit by his mistakes or his success.
One's home is his castle, and one's private life is a precious possession
which cannot be wrested from him.
Carried to its ultimate extreme, this reasoning would lead to the
destruction of social obligation. It is prevented from doing so by an
opposing ideal which is as firmly established in the law-the realization that man is a social animal and in order to exist peaceably he
must give up a portion of himself in return for the mutual advantages
which fl.ow from communal existence. To guarantee liberty we are
called upon to surrender certain freedom of action. Consideration for
others requires reciprocal concessions. There are times when the public
interest demands disclosure of one's activities and achievements. So
society, as an entity, also has rights-which are frequently paramount
to the rights of the individual.
The right of privacy is the child of these two opposite ideals. Like
every new rule of law, it sprang from the spark struck off by clashing
principles. With gradual adjustment of the weight given to these
forces, a balance of values will be achieved and the right of privacy
will reach its full stature as a mature expression of one phase of man's
relationship to his fellow-men.

